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I. INTRODUCTION
Two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National
Mortgage Association (commonly called Fannie Mae) and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (commonly called Freddie Mac)
collapsed on September 7, 2008.' On that date, the Director of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), James B. Lockhart III, put the two GSEs
under the conservatorship of the FHFA and dismissed the firm's chief
executive officers and boards of directors. He also forced the firms to issue
79.9% of their equity to the United States Treasury in exchange for cash
infusions and credit guarantees that have ballooned to a mind-numbing
$400 billion.2 Additional purchases of GSE held securities and GSE issued
debt by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury put the total price-tag of the
government takeover at over $1.1 trillion.
The government bailout was a response to the threat of a tsunami of
losses. The two GSEs, at the time of the government takeover, held
between them ownership of, guarantees on, or securities backed by over
half of the United States' $12 trillion residential mortgages.4 Investors the
world over, which included several major foreign governments, held over
* J. Gilbert Reese Chair in Contract Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College
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Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Director James B.
Lockhart III (Sept. 7, 2008).
2 Id.; The Present Condition and Future Status ofFannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. of the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs.,
111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter The Present Condition and Future Status of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] (statement of James B. Lockhart, Director, Federal
Housing Finance Agency); Press Release, U.S. Dept. Treasury, Office of Public
Affairs, Fact Sheet: Treasury Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (Sept. 7,
2008).
3 See The Future of the Mortgage Marketing. and the Housing Enterprises:
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, I 11th Cong. 5
(2009) [hereinafter Future of the Mortgage Market and Housing Enterprises]
(statement of Edward J. DeMarco, Acting Director, Federal Housing Finance
Agency); Peter J. Wallison & Charles W. Calomiris, The Last Trillion-Dollar
Commitment: The Destruction ofFannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 15 J. STRUCTURED
FIN. 71 (2009).
4 See Future of the Mortgage Market and Housing Enterprises, supra note 3, at 5.
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$5.4 trillion in debt securities backed by the two companies.5 The collapse
had substantial foreign policy ramifications. The largest foreign investor in
United States debt, China, for example, also held large amounts of GSE
debt.6 Virtually every home mortgage lender in the United States relied on
the GSEs to provide liquidity to the residential mortgage market.
Whether the bailout was effective in avoiding deeper, widespread
losses will be argued by economists for ages. We do know, however, that
the collapse of Fannie and Freddie happened in the third quarter of 2008,
initiating the start of the Recession of 2008 from which, as of this writing,
our economy has yet to recover. The trigger for the Recession of 2008 was
the radical increase in mortgage defaults on residential property, felt
harshest in four states (Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada).7 The
defaults caused losses far beyond their nominal amounts because the
mortgage payments were the reference assets of several types of
pyramiding derivative securities, which simultaneously plummeted in value
due to the increase in the mortgage default rates.
Fannie and Freddie had heavy involvement with the creation and
funding of residential mortgages and one of the primary mortgage
derivatives, the mortgage-backed security (MBS). So Fannie and Freddie
are deeply in play in the various theories on the cause of the current
Recession. The debate has macro-economic implications as theorists argue
for various reorganizations of our financial markets and micro-economic
implications as the FHFA struggles with what to do with Fannie and
Freddie. It matters significantly in these debates whether Fannie and
Freddie were victims of, or a primary cause, of the residential real estate
value bubble and subsequent collapse.
Available data, and more is coming out as this Article is going to press,
suggests that Fannie and Freddie were the villains; the agencies were a
primary cause of the domestic real estate bubble. Since the villainy is a
product of the endemic structure of the GSEs themselves, the conclusion
leads to a recommendation to the winding up both the GSEs (and other
similar GSEs) and not use such vehicles in government financial planning.
As of the time of writing of this article, the federal government passed the
5 See The Present Condition and Future Status ofFannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
supra note 2, at 6 (statement of James B. Lockhart III, Director, Federal Housing
Finance Agency).
6 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, MAJOR FOREIGN
HOLDERS OF TREASURY SECURITIES (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
tic/mfh.txt.
7 FEDERAL Hous. FIN. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2009, at 6 (2009). See also
Future of the Mortgage Market and Housing Enterprises, supra note 3, at 5.
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mammoth financial restructuring plan to "stop future financial crises" and
the 2000-page bill omits any solution to our GSE problem.8
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FANNIE AND FREDDIE
The detailed history of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mae has been well told
many, many times. The history is a wandering one, exhibiting at times
grand plans and at times incremental political tinkering. In the end,
Congress backed itself into a corner, creating two unworkable entities that
are so enmeshed in the economy that any change to them is fraught with
significant risk. It will take substantial political courage to fix this mess
and political courage is a very limited commodity at the moment. What is
stunning about the historical tale is how cavalierly Congress changed the
fundamental organizational nature of the agencies four separate times
subsequent to the founding of Fannie Mae in 1938, dramatically changing
the GSE management incentives. Theorists of the "path-dependency" of
law or of the "mission creep" of regulatory agencies should find fertile
ground here in which to grow their theories.
Fannie Mae had its modest origins in 1938; it was created to help an
earlier act, the National Housing Act of 1934, work better.9 The National
Housing Act established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and
empowered the new agency to insure qualifying mortgages.10 The Act
decreased lender risk but did not, as hoped, create a national secondary
market in mortgages. Congress created Fannie Mae, a new federal agency,
to purchase FHA insured mortgages and to resell them to other investors."
It was, in essence, a simple, federally-owned mortgage dealer. Inevitably,
Fannie Mae itself came to hold a portfolio of mortgages, its inventory for
resale. Later Congress added Veterans Administration (VA) and Farmers
Home Administration (FmHA) insured mortgages to Fannie's portfolio.12
From this modest acorn grew the oak tree.
8 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
For a good history of the 1934 Act, see Peter M. Carrozzo, A New Deal for the
American Mortgage: The Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the National Housing
Act and the Birth of the National Mortgage Market, 17 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1
(2008).
10 Congress originally chartered Fannie Mae as a subsidiary of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation. In 1939 Congress transferred Fannie, along with the FHA, to
the new Federal Loan Agency. In 1950 Congress gave supervision of the agency to
the new Housing and Home Finance Agency. It remained there until Congress
transferred supervisions to a new cabinet-level Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) in 1965.1 Carrozzo, supra note 9, at 44.
12 id
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The first big change occurred in 1954. Fannie Mae was absorbing
significant federal funds and Congress did not want to continue to use
general revenue to fund the agency's growth. In response, Congress
reorganized Fannie Mae to enable the agency to use private funds as well as
federal funds. 13 Congress, in the Charter Act of 1954, empowered Fannie
Mae to sell shares and bonds and use the money to purchase mortgages held
in its portfolio. 14 Fannie Mae was also exempted from all state and local
taxes, with the exception of property taxes.15  With financing limits
imposed by annual Congressional budgeting lifted, Fannie Mae exploded,
growing exponentially year after year. Only approval of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury was required for issuing new debt.16
By 1968, Congress did not want Fannie Mae debt included in the public
debt figures, which were starting to show an alarming increase due to the
expenditures from the Vietnam War.' 7 So, in an ultimate triumph of off-
balance sheet financing, Congress, in the 1968 Charter Act, converted the
privately funded part of Fannie Mae into a "government-sponsored
enterprise," a privately-financed secondary market institution, and split off
the residual, much smaller federally-funded part of Fannie Mae into a new
agency, the Government National Mortgage Association, Ginnie Mae.'8
The federal debt no longer reflected the debt issued by Fannie Mae. Fannie
used proceeds from the sale of common stock to retire the Treasury-owned
preferred stock. Private shareholders, not the United States government,
now owned and operated Fannie Mae under a federal corporate charter.' 9
The President did retain the power to appoint five members to the board of
eighteen directors, however.20 The 1968 Act also empowered the new
privately held federal corporation to issue mortgage-backed securities
(MBSs).2
'3 Elyse Boyle, Note, Eliminating the Risk to Taxpayers: Privatizing Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 163, 167 (2009).
14 David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee ofFannie Mae and
Freddie Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV.
1019, 1029 (2008).
" 12 U.S.C. § 1452(e) (2006).
16 Reiss, supra note 14, at 1034.
'7 Richard K. Green & Ann B. Schnare, The Rise and Fall of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac: Lessons Learned and Options for Reform 15 (Nov. 19, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript).
18 Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Home Mortgage
Foreclosure Crisis, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 149, 156 (2009).
19 Mark A. Edwards, Nationalization, De-Nationalization, Re-Nationalization:
Some Historical and Comparative Perspective, 30 PACE L. REV. 124, 142 (2009);
Peterson, supra note 18, at 156.
20 Wallison & Calomiris, supra note 3, at 72.
21 12 U.S.C. § 1719(d) (2006).
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The 1968 reorganization created a Janus. Fannie's charter and later,
after 1970, Freddie's charter, required that they include a disclaimer in all
their securities noting that their debt was not an obligation of the United
States. 22 Fannie and Freddie used this disclaimer to tell Congress and
federal regulators not to worry; "the government is not on the hook for what
we do."23 The corporations also trumpeted the monitoring of their new
private shareholders, who now elected the boards of directors.24 Regulatory
oversight, granted to the U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
grew lax.2 5 At the same time the GSEs benefited from a carefully nurtured
market perception of implicit government banking.2 6 They told Wall Street:
"Don't worry, the Government really is on the hook."2 7 The GSEs could
sell debt at lower interest rates than private rivals. Risk-averse investors,
including pension funds and foreign governments, seeking above Treasury
yields flocked into the GSE bonds. 28 Fannie and Freddie had access to a
virtually unlimited source of cheap cash.
But Fannie and Freddie were not birthed as ordinary private
corporations. They were given a myriad of competitive advantages over the
private players in the secondary mortgage market.2 9 Their charters, for
22 Reiss, supra note 14, at 1023 (determined according to statute). See 12 U.S.C. §
1455(h) (2006) (law regarding Freddie Mac's obligations and MBSs); Id § 1719(b)
(law regarding Fannie Mae's obligations); Id. § 1719(d) (law regarding Fannie's
MBSs).
23 Proposals to Improve the Regulatory Regime for Government Sponsored
Enterprises: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
108th Cong. 2-iii (2004) (statement of Hon. Richard S. Camell, Assocate Professor,
Fordham Law School) [hereinafter Proposals to Improve the Regulatory Regime].
Other leading critics of the implied guarantee include Peter Wallison, Thomas H.
Stanton and Bert Ely. See, e.g., PETER J. WALLISON ET AL., PRIVATIZING FANNIE
MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANKS (2004).
24 Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brieffor the
Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 615
(2010).
25 Fannie and Freddie were regulated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury,
which approved their sale of bonds by the HUD, and the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise oversight (OFHEO). Not only did treasury never deny any of Freddie
and Fannie's requests, but HUD reviewed new programs far less frequently than it
purported to do so. OFHEO was an independent agency created in 1992 and
launched with HUD. It was tasked with overseeing the "safety and soundness" of
the GSEs, although the office eventually proved to be anemic. See, e.g., Reiss
supra note 14, at 1034.
26 Id. at 1043-44.
27 Proposals to Improve the Regulatory Regime, supra note 23, at 2-iii.
28 David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory
Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 741 (2009).
29 See David J. Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Creatures ofRegulatory
Privilege, 61 ALASKA L. REv. (forthcoming 2010).
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example, exempted them from federal securities laws, saving registration
fees for issuing securities and avoiding SEC disclosure requirements, 3 0 and
exempted them from most state and local taxes.3 ' The Secretary of the
Treasury is authorized to purchase Fannie and Freddie debt and once
purchased the debt becomes an obligation of the federal government. 32
Federal law enables fiduciaries to invest in Fannie and Freddie obligations
as if they were government securities.33 Money market funds'
diversification requirements do not apply to Fannie and Freddie
obligations.34 The Federal Reserve Banks acts as Fannie and Freddie's
fiscal agents, the same role they play for the federal government.3 5 Finally
Fannie and Freddie were exempt from the three percent capital/asset ratio
requirement of the FDIC Bank Holding Company Act that governs the
solvency of financial institutions. 36
The third major change came in 1970. Congress, in the Emergency
Home Finance Act of 1970, removed the last major leash. Congress
significantly enlarged Fannie and Freddie's operating authorization. Both
Fannie Mae and the newly minted Freddie Mac received authorization from
Congress to purchase and securitize conventional mortgages as well as
government-insured or guaranteed mortgages. The FHA no longer limited
what Fannie and Freddie could buy. When traditional lenders, banks, did
not have the capital to keep up with the demand for home mortgages in the
early 80s, Fannie and Freddie stepped into the breach by brokering and
underwriting residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs), the so-called
"securitization" of residential mortgages." The final authorization to
dabble fully in the private mortgage market came in 1984 when Congress
30 15 U.S.C. § 78c(42)(C) (2006). Fannie did agree, voluntarily, in 2004 to comply
with several of the SEC disclosure requirements; Freddie filed its first SEC report
the month before it collapsed in 2008.
" 12 U.S.C. § 1452(e) (2000).
32 Id. § 1455(c)(1), (5).
" Id. §§ 1452(g), 1455(e)(1), 1723c.
34 No more than five percent of the assets of a money market fund may be from any
one issuer, except Fannie and Freddie. Some funds held a majority of their assets
in Fannie and Freddie debt.
s 12 U.S.C. § 1452(d).
36 Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies, Tier 1, 12 C.F.R. §
225 app.D (2010).
3 Reiss, supra note 14, at 1030.
38 Freddie Mac issued its first MBS in 1971 and Fannie Mae issued its first MBS in
1981. See FRANK FABozzI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, MORTGAGE AND MORTGAGE-
BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS 21-23 (1992).
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gave Fannie the power to purchase and deal in subordinate lien (second)
mortgages.39
To create the RMBSs secondary mortgage market, firms purchased and
pooled mortgages from primary market lenders (often banks and S&Ls) and
sold securities backed by the mortgage payments to public market
investors. 4 0  The investor cash fueled the secondary mortgage firm
purchases from the primary market originators, which in turn fueled the
primary market originators loans to home buyers. Mortgage capital was
limited only by the appetite of the public trading markets. The actions of
Fannie and Freddie in such securitizations were mimicked by institutional
investors, who sold "private label" RMBSs, those issued without a
government or GSE guarantee that only Ginnie, Fannie or Freddie could
give, and the securitization market for mortgages went into overdrive.4 1
In the 1970 Act, Congress also created a competitor to Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, to form a secondary market for S&L mortgages (Fannie Mae
purchased exclusively from FHA and VA mortgages from mortgage
bankers).4 2 Fannie and Freddie now both purchase mortgages from all
comers; their purchasing practices have converged. In 1989, Freddie was
also converted into a privately held company, traded on the NYSE and
subject to HID oversight. 4 3 In most of the events described in the text,
Fannie played the lead role and Freddie followed along behind (sometimes
by a few years). The focus hereafter will be on Fannie's activities, with
Fannie's and Freddie's numbers aggregated when appropriate.
The fourth change came in 1992. Congress, in the Federal Housing
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, created the quasi-
independent Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)
within HUD and gave it responsibility to ensure that Fannie and Freddie
were "adequately capitalized and operating safely."" Congress funded
with OFHEO with assessments on Fannie and Freddie. The 1992 Act also
established HUD-imposed housing goals for the financing of "affordable
39 See 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(4)(A)-{C) (2006) (granting Freddie permission to deal
in second mortgages); Id. § 1717(b)(5)(A)-(C) (granting Fannie permission to deal
in second mortgages).
40 Reiss, supra note 14, at 1028 (describing the process in three steps).
41 Id. at 1030-31.
4 2 Id. at 1029.
43 Marsha Courchane et al., Industry Changes in the Market for Mortgage Loans,
41 CoNN. L. REv. 1143, 1150 (2009) (The Federal Home Loan Bank System and
its member thrifts originally owned Freddie Mac. It is now a publicly-traded
company like Fannie Mae.).
4 The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, §
1303, 12 U.S.C. § 4502.
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housing," housing in central cities, and housing in rural and "other
underserved" areas.45 HUD periodically thereafter raised the goals.
The GSEs effectively captured OFHEO, the new agency.46 The GSEs
played off their shareholders against the OFHEO over who had effective
control and began a very effective program of political donations to curry
support in Congress. Presidential appointments to the GSE boards were
patronage plums. A section of the board of the GSEs came to look like a
who's who of out-of-work politicians. Rahm Emanuel, for example, the
current Chief of Staff for President Obama held a board position at Freddie
in 2000 and 2001, after he left his position as senior advisor to President
Clinton and before his successful run for a House seat.4 7
The 1992 Act's affordable housing goals were an outgrowth of the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) that required federally
insured commercial banks, as a quid pro quo for being covered by the
FDIC 48 to lend to borrowers in low and moderate income neighborhoods.
Regulatory agencies pressured regulated banks and thrifts to meet the
affordable housing goals. 4 9 Enforcement was conducted through agency
threats not to approve mergers and acquisitions requests, and threats not to
approve new operational programs. The CRA goals were referenced
explicitly in the 1992 Act that established affordable housing goals for
Fannie and Freddie.o
The 1992 Act was a watershed in the life of the GSEs. Prior to the
1992 Act the CEOs of the GSEs were acutely aware of political pressures,
primarily from Republicans and from free-market economists, to revoke
their federal charters and privatize the firms as for-profit state corporations.
As ordinary corporations the GSEs would lose the many perks associated
with the federal charter, particularly the "implicit federal government
guarantee" that enabled the GSEs to place debt interest rates lower than
their private competitors.51 To save their federal charter the GSEs decided
to enter into the lobbying arena in a big way. But selling the agencies'
liquidity function in the secondary mortgage markets was not very jazzy.
The GSEs could sell, however, the GSEs ability to open up affordable
housing for distressed neighborhoods and for lower to middle income
45 12 U.S.C. § 4564 (2006).
46 See Thomas H. Stanton, Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Reality Catches Up
to Public Administration Theory, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 632, 632 (2009).
47 Rahm Emanuel Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/
articles/Rahm-Emanuel-381074?part-0.
48 In 1995 Congress applied the CRA affordable housing guidelines to all banks.
49 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Fed. Res. Sys. Speech, The Community
Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges, at the Community Affairs
Research Conference (Mar. 30, 2007).
o 12 U.S.C. §§ 4562-64 (2006).
5' Fannie and Freddie Ride Again, ECoNOMIST, July 5, 2007.
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owners.5 2 Community groups applauded and the GSEs became the toast of
the inner city Democrats. Fannie CEO Jim Johnson53 opened his campaign
in 1991 with an eye catching announcement of a $10 billion "Opening the
Doors to Affordable Housing" initiative.54 He convinced Congress in the
1992 Act to include a mandate for the affordable housing goals of the
GSEs. The 1992 Act put Fannie (and Freddie) in direct competition with its
original 1938 client, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).ss Two
years after the 1992 Act CEO Johnson doubled down and announced a
staggering new goal of $1 trillion for its "Opening Doors" initiative.5 6 The
FHA loan insurance business struggled and began to erode severely after
2000. With the government takeover of Fannie and Freddie, FHA was
resurrected in 2009.57
It was lobbying genius; Johnson saved the GSE federal charters, but
began our inevitable march to the cliff-the current collapse of the real estate
market bubble. Fannie and Freddie thereafter progressively loosened, over
a sixteen-year period, their qualifying loan requirements and portfolio risk
limits.58 All the structural incentives were in place by early 2000 to create a
52 Edward Pinto, Government Housing Policies in the Lead-up to the Financial
Crisis: A Forensic Study 50 (Aug. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/Pinto-Government-Housing-Policies-Crisis.pdf
5 Jim Johnson played a major role in creating our current problems. Before
joining Fannie he was a managing director at Lehman Brothers and while there
handled the Countrywide Financial account. Lehman and Countrywide failed
because of their investments in the subprime mortgage market. He thus had a hand
in the failure of four (including Fannie and Freddie) of the largest financial
companies in the world. His failures are not confined to the private side. He was
the campaign manager for Walter Mondale's failed 1984 presidential bid and
chaired the vice president selection committee for the presidential campaign of
John Kerry. Then Senator Barack Obama appointed him to chair his vice president
selection committee for one day, before withdrawing the appointment when it was
reported that he had received loans directly from the CEO of Countrywide. The
OFHEO found that during his tenure at Fannie he received bonuses based on
cooked earnings reports and that Fannie had underreported his total compensation.
Afterwards, he moved on to be on the board of Goldman Sachs, Target
Corporation, and several other major corporations. He is now vice chairman of a
private banking firm, Perseus LLC. For an article on Johnson's lobbying activities
at Fannie, see Matthew Cooper, A Medici With Your Money: Fannie Mae's
Strategic Generosity, SLATE, Feb. 23, 1997, http://www.slate.com/id/2423.
54 Pinto, supra note 52, at 66.
5 Id. at 54.
soId. at 66.
s7 See Marsha Courchane et al., Industry Changes in the Market for Mortgage
Loans, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1175 (2009) (describing the declining market share
of FHA).
58 Peter J. Wallison, The True Origins of the Financial Crisis, 13 AEl ON THE
IssuEs 7, 8 (2009).
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financial mess. 59 There were no effective oversight controls over Fannie
and Freddie management by shareholders, debt holders or regulatory
authorities. Fannie and Freddie management had access to cheap money to
invest in a rapidly growing market that generated easy returns. And
management was subject to heavy political pressure to grow as fast and as
quickly as it could in the riskiest corners of the new market. GSE leverage
soared and its underwriting standards eroded.
The opening undeniable warning of severe management problems came
in 2003 when Freddie Mac announced that it would have to restate its
earnings for 2000-2002.60 In 2004 OFHEO reported widespread
accounting fraud at Fannie Mae and later that year Fannie agreed to restate
its earnings back to 2001 .61 Fannie managers' compensation bonuses were
tied to earnings. As earnings started to fall in the early 2000s the managers'
manipulated Fannie's financial records to maximize their pay and appease
their shareholders.6 2
The scandal revealed the extent to which the GSEs were exposed to
operational risk (from perverse management incentives) and interest rate
risk (on their portfolio of mortgages and mortgage backed securities).
Astonishingly, any Congressional efforts to reform the two GSEs failed
until 2008,63 when the GSEs collapsed.
III. THE COLLAPSE AND THE CONSERVATORSHIP
In 2007 the subprime mortgage crisis revealed itself. An increasing
number of borrowers in the subprime market could not meet their mortgage
payments. Home foreclosures increased and home prices declined as
foreclosures added a large inventory of homes to the market.6 Tighter
lending standards made it more difficult for borrowers to get mortgages.
59 See Pinto, supra note 52, at 149-51 (providing a long list of elements that fueled
the boom and led to the bust of the real estate market).
60 Reiss, supra note 14, at 1037.
6 Id. at 1039.
62 Regulators filed 101 civil charges against CEO Franklin Raines, CFO J. Timothy
Howard, and former controller Leanne G. Spencer to recoup more than $115
million in bonus payments and $100 million in penalties. The three agreed to pay
fines totaling $3 million, which were paid by Fannie's directors and officers
insurance policies. See Press Release, Office of Fed. Hous. Enterp. Oversight,
OFHEO Files Notice of Charges Against Former Fannie Mae Executives Franklin
Rains, Timothy Howard and Leanne Spencer (Dec. 18, 2006), available at
http://www.alta.org/govt/issues/ 06/RainesNOC 121806.pdf.
63 See Helen Thompson, The Political Origins of the Financial Crisis: The
Domestic and International Politics of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 80 POL. Q.
17 (2009). .
6 See Brent J. Horton, In Defense of Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61
FLA. L. REv. 827, 831 (2009).
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The depreciation in home prices led to growing losses for Fannie and
Freddie, which at the time backed the majority of residential mortgages.
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve granted both Fannie and Freddie
access to the Federal Reserve low-interest loans (at rates similar to
commercial banks) and authorized Treasury to purchase GSE stock.
Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson defended the soundness of the GSEs
and told the markets he would defend them in their "current form;"67
language he would later regret.
The bailout failed. Fannie and Freddie shares continued to plummet in
the trading markets, losing close to ninety percent of their value. On July
30, 2008, President Bush signed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act
of 2008 abolishing the OFHEO and creating the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA) with power to place the GSE into receivership or
conservatorship.68  On September 7, 2008, new FHFA director James
Lockhart announced that he had put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under
conservatorship of the FHFA. 69 Treasury Secretary Paulson, appearing at
the same press conference stated that "I attribute the need for today's action
primarily to the inherent conflict and flawed business model embedded in
the GSE structure, and to the ongoing housing correction., 7 0
In the conservatorship, director Lockhart implemented, among other
things, the following steps:7'
1. The FHFA assumed the power of the boards of directors and
management.
2. The CEOs were dismissed and new CEOs appointed.
3. The dividends on the preferred and common stock would be
eliminated but the stock would remain outstanding. Payments on
debt instruments would continue.
65 See Boyle, supra note 13, at 172.66 See The Present Condition and Future Status ofFannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
supra note 2.
67 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M.
Paulson, Jr., on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect
Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm.
68 Thomas E. Plank, Regulation and Reform of the Mortgage Market and the
Nature of Mortgage Loans: Lessons From Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 S.C.
L. REv. 779, 801 (2009).
69 Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, supra note 1.
70 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 67.
71 W. Scott Frame, The 2008 Federal Intervention to Stabilize Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper Series, Paper No.
2009-13, Apr. 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1458662.
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4. All political activities, including all lobbying would halt
immediately and all charitable giving would be reviewed.
5. Treasury would provide capital as need to correct any net worth
deficiencies that Fannie and Freddie would record through 2012.72
The GSEs issued senior preferred stock with a ten percent coupon
to the Treasury and agreed to issue common stock warrants
representing an ownership stake of 79.9%, at an exercise price of
$.00001 per share with warrant duration of twenty years.
6. Each GSE retained mortgage and mortgage backed security
portfolio was capped at $850 billion as of December 31, 2009 and
had to decline by ten percent a year until it reached $250 billion.
The FHFA designed the stock and warrants to protect the senior and
subordinated debt and the mortgage backed securities of the GSEs. The
GSEs existing common and preferred shareholders will bear losses ahead of
the government.73 Banks that held Fannie and Freddie preferred shares
took huge write downs. 74 The NYSE has delisted the GSE shares. 7s In
addition to the government conservatorship, the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury committed to purchasing GSE debt, mortgage backed securities
and stock.76 The Federal Reserve also committed to extending loans to
GSEs at the primary credit rate.77
The total obligations of the two GSEs are just over $5 trillion.
Compare this to the $9.5 trillion of officially reported United States public
debt at the time of the takeover. At issue is whether the assets and the
liabilities of the two GSEs must now be incorporate into the federal budget
planning due to government control of the entities. The international
market in credit default swap contracts on U.S. government debt increased
a whopping 3.5 basis points after the government takeover, to a record
eighteen basis points (up from six in April) in reaction to the concerns
72 The text represents the December 2009 amendment to the original September
2008 commitment. See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Releases
Letter on the Status of the Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Feb.
2, 2010) (explaining that the Treasury is committed to each Fannie and Freddie to
the greater of $200 billion or $200 billion plus cumulative new worth deficits
experienced during 2010, 2011 and 2012, less any net worth surplus remaining as
of December 31, 2012).
73 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 67.
74 Frame, supra note 71.
7 Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Directs Delisting of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac Stock from New York Stock Exchange (June 16, 2010).
76 The Present Condition and Future Status ofFannie Mae and Freddie Mac, supra
note 2.
7 Reiss, supra note 29.
78 The Present Condition and Future Status ofFannie Mae and Freddie Mac, supra
note 2.
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about the size of the government bailout.7 9 The net exposure to taxpayers
will depend on future housing prices and mortgage default rates. At the
time of the takeover, both Fannie and Freddie had positive net worth but
first quarter net losses for both GSEs totaled $33.1 billion.80 They owned
or guaranteed fifty-six percent of all single family mortgages in the country,
or $5.4 trillion of the total $11.9 trillion outstanding mortgage debt."
The GSEs had suffered heavy write-downs on their securities portfolio
of both private-label mortgage backed securities (PLMB S)82 and their own
and each other's securities, large loses on their whole loan portfolio, and
large losses on their loan guarantees. The combined loses at Fannie and
Freddie in the first two full years of the housing crisis, from July 2007 to
July 2009 totaled $165 billion." The largest losses stemmed principally
from purchases and guarantees of mortgages originated in 2006 and 2007. 4
The losses were due in large part to substantial home price decreases and
correlated mortgage defaults in just four states: Arizona, California, Florida
and Nevada. The losses, soon after the date of the conservatorship,
exhausted the value of each company's shareholder equity and began what
has become a recurring series of draws on the Treasury commitments to
buy senior preferred stock.
The stunning aspect of the bailout/conservatorship was the snap
judgment on whom to wipe out and whom to protect. Treasury, by
purchasing senior preferred stock, wiped out the stock value of the common
shareholders and the outstanding preferred shareholders. Fannie's common
stock, valued at eighty-five dollars in mid-2007, now trades for around
forty cents and is the nation's hottest penny stock on the market.8 6
Preferred shareholders also suffered huge losses. One would expect that the
shareholders lose everything in an insolvency proceeding, so why the fuss?
Treasury protected all the debt holders, even those holding junior
subordinated debt. 87 Debt holders in an insolvency proceeding usually
79 Dawn Kopecki, U.S. Considers Bringing Fannie, Freddie on to Budget
(Updatel), BLOOMBERG, Sept. 11, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=adr.czwVm3ws.
80 The Present Condition and Future Status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, supra
note 2.
81 Id.
8 21 d. at 3-5.
Future of the Mortgage Market and Housing Enterprises, supra note 3, at 4.
84Id.
Future of the Mortgage Market and Housing Enterprises, supra note 3, at 3.
Fannie's total credit losses from the four states, as a percentage of total credit
losses in 2009, was a whopping fifty-eight percent; Freddie's was sixty-four
percent.
86 Floyd Norris, Caveat Emptor, Continued, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at B 1.
87 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Senior Preferred
Stock Purchase Agreement (Sept. 7, 2008), available at
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suffer substantial losses, with junior debt holders often absorbing huge
losses that can approximate the losses of the preferred shareholders. New
credit (e.g., debtor in possession financing) routinely takes priority over all
the old creditors as well as the shareholders. The new advanced priority
capital allows the firm to stabilize and reorganize. So why did Treasury
step in to protect the debt holders and not the shareholders?
The answer is hard to digest and very controversial. Treasury bailed
out existing creditors to make explicit the previously implicit government
guarantee of Fannie and Freddie. 8 The implicit guarantee had enticed
foreign banks and governments to buy Fannie and Freddie bonds as
alternatives to U.S. Treasuries.89 Continuing purchases of Treasuries by
some of the governments, China and Japan, were essential to the Treasury's
continuing ability to sell its debt to finance the U.S. government's huge
deficits.90 Foreign banks used Fannie and Freddie bonds to meet capital
requirements that they had to meet to stay in business (make loans). A
downgrade of Fannie and Freddie debt could dry up credit in foreign
economies, economies that buy U.S. exports and hold our dollars.
Threatened by political and economic crisis, Treasury immediately
caved. The merits of this snap decision will be the subject of debate
whenever and wherever financial history is taught and studied. I personally
believe the decision to be rushed, panicky, and poorly thought-out. At
minimum, Treasury should have negotiated concessions from creditors
before it announced the conservatorship; it had time. More importantly,
why did Treasury give up normal debtor-in-possession financing giving
time for a proper reorganization? I believe we would now be much better
off had Fannie and Freddie been formally and properly reorganized using
traditional Chapter 11 methods and strategies. The new message to the
world: our formal financial rules can be gamed if enough political pressure
can be put on Treasury.
But note the identity of those who did not get the benefit of Treasury's
good will. Pension plans and domestic banks (usually regional banks) in
large numbers held Fannie and Freddie preferred stock, believing the stock
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/pspa-factsheet090708%20hp ll28.p
df.8 8 See The Present Condition and Future Status ofFannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
supra note 2 (stating that "the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements have
given investors confidence that there is an effective guarantee of GSE
obligations . . ).
89 See Jason Thomas, An Assessment ofFannie Mae and Freddie Mac's
Contribution to the Financial Crisis of2008 (George Washington Univ., Dep't of
Fin., Dec. 14, 2009).
90 See Thompson, supra note 63.
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was sure to pay the dividends promised.9' They also relied on the implicit
backing of the GSEs. They were wrong and suffered total losses on their
investments. 9 2  So the Chinese government and German banks get the
benefit of taxpayer dollars and our retirees and local banks did not. This, of
course, strikes middle-class taxpayers, once informed of the details of the
bailout, as an insane government financial decision. I throw my lot in with
the taxpayers.
IV. EVIDENCE OF FANNIE AND FREDDIE'S CAUSE OF THE COLLAPSE
OF THE MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKET
The Federal Reserve Open Market Committee, to stimulate the
economy, dropped significantly the federal funds target rate, the rate at
which banks loan money to each other, in 1997-1998 and again in 2001."
The Federal Reserve then used its Open Market Operations to make the
federal funds effective rate follow the federal funds target rate.94 Reducing
the federal funds rate increases the money supply, lowers banks costs of
raising capital, and stimulates bank lending. Artificially low rates give
banks the opportunity to print money by borrowing low and lending high.
But the banks need to find borrowers; real estate purchasers are and always
have been prime candidates.
Comfortable money for banks came from matching the cash flows on
the dollars borrowed and on those loaned, but serious money for banks
came from factoring the loans (selling them for cash) and reinvesting the
new money in new loans, which were again factored and so on-creating an
accelerating vortex of money and credit.95 When large investors no longer
had the appetite to buy the whole loans, the loans were pooled and slices of
the pooled and loan returns sold as securities (securitized) to the public
markets as MBSs or derivative securities.9 6 Those securities could
themselves be pooled and re-sliced and sold to the public markets (as
91 Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Preferred Stock Losses, MADDOX HARGETT &
CARUSO, P.C. BLOG (Nov. 30, 2009, 12:41 PM),
http://www.investorprotection.com/blog/2009/11/30/fannie-mae-freddie-mac-
preferred-stock-losses/.
2 Id
93 See Historical Changes of the Target Federal Funds and Discount Rates, FED.
RES. BANK OF N.Y., http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/statistics/dlyrates/fedrate.html
(last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
94 See Federal Funds Data Historical Search, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/omo/dmm/historical/fedfunds/index.cfn (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010) (inputting date range Jan. 1, 2001-Dec. 31, 2001 and
selecting data fields "Daily Effective Rate" and "Target Rate").
9s See, e.g., Reiss, supra note 14, at 1028 (describing this as step two in the
mortgage origination process).96 Id. (describing this process as step three in the mortgage origination process).
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collateral debt obligations: CDOs and CDOs squared). When the markets
ran out of securities backed by real assets, banks created synthetic CDOs
backed by promises to pay based on the price of referenced pools of real
assets (raw bets on the price of MBSs or even CDOs).98 In short, the
artificially low interest rates created a strong pull on the banks to find and
invest in mortgage loans.
The mortgage loans had to be sound (with predictable and reasonable
rates of default), however, otherwise the owners of the MBSs and CDOs
would lose money and the market for the derivatives would collapse (which
it did in 2008). But, and here's the rub, the demand side pressure for
mortgage loans had a feed-back loop effect on housing prices, pushing them
up artificially, which in turn had an inherently negative effect on the quality
of the loans themselves.99 Loan collateral, the homes, was inherently over-
valued. Moreover, the demand side appetite put pressure on the primary
market to loosen underwriting standards, a pressure that could have been
and should have been resisted. 00 But Fannie and Freddie, which could
have been an instrument of resistance (refusing to act as a secondary market
player in loans that were too risky), became an instrument of its destruction.
When the financial crisis hit in 2008, an astonishing forty-nine percent of
the nation's outstanding family-mortgage loans had high risk
characteristics, making default more likely, 1 and Fannie and Freddie
owned a majority of them.10 2 In short, Fannie and Freddie became the
primary demand side player in excessively 03 risky loans; over a sixteen-
year period from 1992 until 2008, they stimulated the risky loan origination
market.o0
97 CDOs are securities comprised of rated tranches from private MBSs. CDOs
squared are securities comprised of rated tranches from CDOs. See Richard E.
Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed to
Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359 (2009).
98 For an easy read on the role CDOs played in the market crisis see, MICHAEL
LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT (W. W. Norton & Co., 1st ed. 2010).
99 See Mendales, supra note 97, at 1393-94
'
00 Id. at 1393.
1t Pinto, supra note 52, at 17.
102 Id. at 60 fig.22, 76 fig.28.
103 "Excessively" is defined as loans that are not priced appropriately for their high
risk.
104 For a similar analysis but using economic theory, see Frederic A. Pelouze,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the 2008 Financial Crisis (Working Paper
Series, April 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1424456 (moral hazard);
Andrew T. Young, A Government-Sponsored Crisis: How Fannie and Freddie
Caused the Recession (W. Va. Univ., Dep't of Econ., May 3, 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1599642 (adverse selection).
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Consider the GSEs' financial position in late 2007.0 Historically, an
eighty percent loan-to-market value of the property (LTV) is usually
considered a secure mortgage loan; the owners must supply twenty percent
of the purchase price. By 1992, banks seemed to have accepted as
reasonable a ninety percent LTV. Yet, over the period of 1992 to 2007
Fannie and Freddie acquired $1.3 trillion in home purchase loans with a
ninety-five percent LTV or more, an eye-popping sixty-two percent of all
such high LTV loans originated over the same period.106 By the mid-2000s,
the zero down to three percent down loans became the dominant form of
residential mortgages.'07 Fannie and Freddie were the primary buyers of
these loans. These loans are now defaulting at seven to eight times the
level of traditionally underwritten loans with a LTV of ninety or less. 08
Fannie began buying ninety-seven percent LTV loans in 1994 and one-
hundred percent LTV loans in 2000.109 To make matters worse, from 1997
to 2007 the GSEs acquired $2.2 trillion in de facto subprime loans ($1.5
trillion)"o and private label securities (PLSs) backed by actual subprime
loans ($700 billion)."' The dollar amounts of de facto subprime loans and
of PLS backed by subprime loans purchased by the GSEs were 1.5 times
the total of subprime PLSs otherwise held in the markets.1 2 The de facto
1os The data comes from Edward Pinto, How Did Paul Krugman Get It So Wrong?
(Nov. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.scribd.com/doc/22327819/
Pinto-How-Did-Paul-Krugman-Get-It-So-Wrong- 11-9-09. See also Edward Pinto,
Here is the Answer to the Question You Asked (Oct. 9, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript). For a view contrary to this paper, see Thomas, supra note 89 (private
market players were the main culprits in the collapse); Peterson, supra note 19. For
an effective rebuttal, see Brent J. Horton, In Defense ofPrivate-Label Mortgage-
Backed Securities, 61 FLA. L. REv. 827 (2009) (government competition with the
private markets drove race to high risk).
106 Pinto, How Did Paul Krugman Get It So Wrong?, supra note 105, at 1.
107 See Noelle Knox, First Rung on Property Ladder Gets Harder to Reach, USA
TODAY, July 17, 2007, at lA.
108 They have a serious delinquency rate of 11.56% compare with a serious
delinquency rate of 1.8% for traditional loans. Derived from data found at Fannie
Mae, 2009 Third Quarter Credit Supplement (Nov. 5, 2009),
http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/sec/2009/q3credit-summary.pdf.
109 Pinto, How Did Paul Krugman Get It So Wrong?, supra note 105, at 1.
110 These were loans in which the borrowers had a credit score, a FICO score, of
less than 660. FICO scores were invented in 1989 and have become the common
means for evaluating a borrower's credit history. The definition of subprime in
theory excludes any loans that Fannie and Freddie purchase as whole loans but
Fannie and Freddie began to purchase loans that looked very much like subprime
loans, classifying them as "prime," and rendering the two terms largely useless as
an indicator of loan risk in its portfolio. The practice caused considerable
confusion among those trying to assess Fannie and Freddie role in the mortgage
meltdown. See Id.
"' Id.
112 Id. at 2.
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subprime loans are now defaulting at eight to nine times the level of
traditionally underwritten loans," 3 and the subprime PLSs are defaulting at
eighteen to nineteen times the level of the GSEs traditionally underwritten
loans.1 4 The GSEs also stumbled into the Alt-A market: Over the period
from 2002 to 2007 the GSEs acquired $773 billion in de facto Alt-A
loans"' and private securities backed by actual Alt-A loans, fifty-five
percent of all such loans originated nationwide over the period."'6  The
loans are now defaulting at nine to ten times the level of the GSEs
traditionally underwritten loans.' 17
How did Fannie and Freddie work its way into such a precarious
position? It started with the HUD affordable housing mandates under the
1992 Act, the "Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness
Act." Private banks had been subject to affordable housing goals since
1977 and in 1992 the goals also applied Fannie and Freddie."' With banks
anxious to meet the goals and Fannie and Freddie anxious to meet the goals,
there was only one way to do it-relax lending standards in the targeted
distressed communities and among targeted borrowers. So began the use of
"flexible" or "innovative" lending standards to allow for the acceptances of
loans of more than ninety-seven percent LTV, of loans to those with
impaired credit, high debt ratios, and "creative" (questionable) income
potential." 9 Loans so made were tagged as "goals rich" loanS.120
Originating banks lowered lending standards for CRA loans, counting the
loans towards their affordable housing goals, and sold close to fifty percent
of the total CRA originations from 2000 to 2007 to Fannie and Freddie,
" These traditionally underwritten loans have a FICO of over 660. They have a
serious delinquency rate of 16.08% if the FICO is less than 620 and a delinquency
rate of 11.32% if the FICO is less than 660 but more than 620. Fannie Mae, supra
note 108.
114 Pinto, How Did Paul Krugman Get It So Wrong?, supra note 105.
" An Alt-A loan is a risky loan, riskier than prime but less risky than subprime,
that does not meet the GSEs traditional purchasing requirements due to its size or
other factors about the loan that is not related directly to the borrower's credit
history. Fannie and Freddie purchased loans that were classified as prime when in
fact they were Alt-A.
116 Pinto, How Did Paul Krugman Get It So Wrong?, supra note 105, at 1.
"' See 12 U.S.C. §§ 4562-64 (2006). The term "enterprise" as used in these
sections means Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 12 U.S.C. § 4502(6) (2006).
"9 Pinto, How Did Paul Krugman Get It So Wrong?, supra note 105. The
traditional "Three C's" of mortgage credit are collateral, character, and capacity.
Collateral is represented by down payment percentage or loan-to-value (LTV);
character is credit history of the borrower; capacity is the mortgage debt ratio to
income and total debt ratio to income and stability of income of the borrower. All
three C's weakened substantially in the sixteen years from 1992 to 2008.
120 See Thomas, supra note 89, at 14.
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which used the loans to meet their affordable housing goals as well.121
Moreover, Fannie and Freddie bought PLSs backed by subprime loans with
CRA originations to count them towards their affordable housing goals.122
Keep in mind that Fannie and Freddie were more than willing participants
in the affordable housing goals, they asked for them so as to establish a
favorable lobbying position in Congress to protect their privileged federal
charters.
On June 18, 2009, the National Mortgage News reported that James
Lockhart III, the first directors of the FHFA, acknowledged that, "[in]
retrospect" the affordable housing goals "caused [Fannie and Freddie] to do
things they shouldn't have done." 23
Had the banks and Fannie and Freddie limited the loosening of their
underwriting standards to CRA loans, the mortgage crisis would not have
been a crisis. However the lowered underwriting standards inflected all
underwriting standards.124 If CRA lending could use the lower standards,
why not apply the lower standards to non-CRA lending? Why not make
high LTV loans on condos in Florida and retirement homes in Arizona?
The cheap money from the Federal Reserve was there for these purchases
as well. From 1992 to 2007 the percentage of conventional purchase
money mortgages with the borrower putting less than ten percent down
more than tripled.125 Home ownership, level for over thirty years, grew
from 64.2% of the population to a peak in 2004 of 69.2% of the
population.126 In the end, the loan culture collapsed-no risk was too high
to underwrite. "Liar's loans,"1 27 loans granted without any documentation
from the borrower and without any verification from the originator,
represented the pinnacle of the folly.
Fannie and Freddie shareholders relied on the federal regulators for
monitoring company soundness. Fannie and Freddie debt holders relied on
121 See Pinto, How Did Paul Krugman Get It So Wrong?, supra note 105, at 1.
122 See id.
123 Letter to the Editor, GSEs 'AH Goals, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, July 13, 2009,
at 6.
124 Pinto, How Did Paul Krugman Get It So Wrong?, supra note 105.
125 EDWARD PINTO, THE GAO's ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATION
FOR AGENCY OPTION AS A REPLACEMENT STRUCTURE FOR THE GSEs (Sep. 24,
2009).
126 Pinto, supra note 52, at 23.
127 Liar's Loans are the "low-doc" or "no-doc" mortgages. These are loan
programs are designed for borrowers who have a hard time producing income and
asset verifying documents, such as prior tax returns. Specifically, loans are called
liar loans because the Simple Interactive Statistical Analysis (SISA) or No Income,
No Asset (NINA) features open the door for abuse when borrowers or their
mortgage brokers or loan officers overstate income or assets in order to qualify the
borrower for a larger mortgage.
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the implicit government guarantee of their debt. And Fannie and Freddie
management captured its primary regulatory agency, the OFHEO, with the
effectiveness of its lobbying of and its campaign contributions to members
of Congress.
V. FANNIE AND FREDDIE UNDER GOVERNMENT CONSERVATORSHIP:
A NATIONALIZED SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET, POLITICIZED
GOALS AND A FEDERAL RESERVE QUANDARY
In the first quarter of 2009, after the takeover, Fannie and Freddie's
combined share of the purchase of mortgages originated in the quarter was
seventy-three percent, reflecting a wholesale withdrawal of private
secondary mortgage market players and of banks willing to hold whole
loans.12 8 If you add the FHA and the VA loans, the four agencies are now
responsible for over eighty-five percent of all new mortgage loans being
originated.12 9 The government has nationalized the secondary mortgage
market, and by doing so, has effectively nationalized the entire mortgage
finance market. The federal government is responsible for the credit risk on
$6 trillion in mortgage loans.o The amount is fifty-five percent of all
outstanding home mortgage debt.' 3 1 If the home mortgages and MBSs on
the balance sheets of FDIC insurance banks, thrifts and other related entities
are added, the percentage rises to over eighty-four percent. 132 Moreover the
credit risk on the loans is substantial; as of March 31, 2009, total mortgage
debt in the country had a gross LTV ratio of ninety percent, the highest
ratio in modern history. 33
The Directors of the FHFA as conservators of Fannie and Freddie have
put in place several major programs. First, the FHFA has strengthened the
GSEs underwriting standards, ironically in essence, rolling them back to
pre-1992 levels that were in place before the 1992 Act that mandated the
affordable housing goals.134 The effect on the mortgage market, of course,
128 Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, supra note 72.129 EDWARD PINTO, FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE BAILOUT OF THE GSEs:
CONTEMPLATING A MORTGAGE INDUSTRY RELIANT ON GOVERNMENT STIMULUS
(Sept. 1, 2009).
130 Interview by Erik Schatzker, Host of Inside Track, Bloomberg, with Anthony
Sanders, Professor, George Mason Univ. (June 14, 2010).
131 PINTO, supra note 129.
132 id.
133 id.
134 See FED. Hous. FIN. AGENCY, CONSERVATOR'S REPORT ON THE ENTERPRISES'
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: SECOND QUARTER 2010, at 6 (2010).
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is to tighten lending. Mortgage rates have continued to drop, however, for
qualified lenders as banks still have access to cheap money.
Second, the activities of Fannie and Freddie have become intensely
politicized. Government ownership begets government pressure to pursue
government goals. There are several examples.
The FHFA has implemented a foreclosure holiday program for
qualifying borrowers. Known as the Home Affordable Modification
Program program (HAMP), Fannie and Freddie announced a willingness to
limit monthly mortgage payments to thirty-one percent of a qualified
borrower's total pretax monthly income. 13 6 The program has thus far been
a failure, adding less than 340,000 homeowners, far less than the target
group of "3 to 4 million., 137  The loans targeted by HAMP are so
problematic that even the modifications usually will not stave off instant or
eventual default. Moreover, the program displaced more effective private
sector efforts to modify mortgage loans.13 1
A related program is the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP)
aimed at helping homeowners refinance if they are current on their
payments and lower their mortgage payments by taking advantage of lower
mortgage rates in the market. 139 Homeowners with an LTV of between
80% and 125% can qualify and the GSEs will refinance without requiring
additional mortgage insurance.140 Like HAMP, HARP has had a very
limited success.
Now there is concern that the government is taking seriously a proposal
by a top Morgan Stanley economist for a "Slam Dunk Stimulus"l41
composed of the wholesale refinancing of all Fannie and Freddie
mortgages, without regard to the current value of the underlying property of
the borrowers' creditworthiness, a sort of "one-time amnesty." If one-half
13 Binyamin Appelbaum, Mortgage Securities it Holds Pose Sticky Problem for
Fed, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at Bl.
136 See Chad D. Emerson, A Troubled House of Cards: Examining How the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Fails to Resolve the Foreclosure
Crisis, 61 OKLA. L. REv. 561 (2008).
137 FED. RES. BANK OF Bos., HAMP LOAN MODIFICATION STATISTICS, available at
http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/foreclosures/data/NE-HAMP201005.pdf.
138 Foreclosure Preventions Part II: Are Loan Servicers Hononing Their
Commitment to Help Preserve Homeownership?: Hearing Before H Comm. on
Oversight & Gov. Reform, 111th Cong. 3 (2010) (statement of Edward J. Pinto).
139 Future of the Mortgage Market and Housing Enterprises, supra note 3, at 9.
140 Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Authorized Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to Expand Home Affordable Refinance Program to 125 Percent Loan-
to-Value (July 1, 2009).
141 Nick Timiraos, 'Free Stimulus' via Refinancing, Debate Grows, WALL ST. J.
DEV. BLOG (July 30, 2010, 2:11 PM); David Greenlawn, Slam Dunk Stimulus,
GLOBAL ECON. F. (July 29, 2010).
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the number of government guaranteed mortgages were refinanced, he
argued, the new lower rates would put $46 billion a year in cash into the
pockets of borrowers and it would act as an economic stimulus.142 The
owners of MBS, of course would take immediate losses on their securities.
The position roiled the fixed income market and led Treasury Secretary
Geithner to quell thoughts of "major changes."l43 But government
ownership of so large a slice of the mortgage market makes it tempting to
say the least, to use the position for "silver bullet" economic cure proposals.
Government market power in the secondary mortgage market also has
major market implications, just as the market power of any monopolist,
public or private, has major implications. To see the use of raw market
power and its potential consider the current demands of Fannie and Freddie
on large commercial banks for loan repurchases. The GSEs are demanding
that the banks repurchase at par some of the toxic loans sold.to the GSEs as
a condition of continuing to do business with them.'" The GSEs argue that
the banks made bad loans and then sold the loans to the GSEs under false
description. 14 5  The threat to suspend business is very potent, making
litigation over the circumstances of the loans unnecessary. The banks can
plead their case but Fannie and Freddie hold all the cards. If the banks do
not persuade the GSEs of their bona fides, the banks have to capitulate and
repurchase; litigation is out of the question.
The assumption might be that the mortgage crisis has tightened up
underwriting standards across the markets, but there is a major leak. The
roll back of the underwriting standards at Fannie and Freddie 4 6 have
reduced the agencies competition with the FHA, which now has shouldered
the mantle of facilitating loans (through federal insurance) to low and
middle income borrowers. As the number of FHA loans has skyrocketed,
there is a serious question about whether the new FHA loans are themselves
going to generate excessively high default rates.' FHA loans of ninety-
seven percent or more LTV may comprise over one-fifth of the current total
mortgage market.147 Expert Edward Pinto estimates that, under a worst
142 Greenlawn, supra note 141.
"43 COrbett B. Daly, US. Treasury-No Change to Fannie, Freddie Policy,
REUTERS, Aug. 5, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0514276420100805.
1" See Floyd Norris, Sticking Banks with the Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 2010, at
Bl.
145 See, e.g., Fannie Mae, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 95 (Aug. 5, 2010);
Freddie Mac, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 65 (Aug. 9, 2010).
146 See Unfinished Business, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2010, at 71.
147 See The Future of the Federal Housing Administration's Capital Reserves:
Assumptions, Predictions, and Implications for Homebuyers: Hearing Before
Subcomm. on the Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Edward Pinto, Real Estate Financial Services
Consultant).
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case scenario analysis, the government may have to bailout the FHA with
another $43 billion once defaults manifest on its insurance agreements.14 8
The political pressure to subsidize home ownership in targeted communities
is too powerful apparently to be affected by anything as minor as a full
blown financial crisis.
Finally, the participation of the Federal Reserve in the Fannie and
Freddie bailout has produced major regulatory side-effects. An important
part of the support of Fannie and Freddie came to be the wholesale
purchase of some of their most toxic assets by the Federal Reserve. The
Fed bought and now owns close to $1.1 trillion of the GSE's mortgage
securities.14 9 The proceeds of the sales went to the GSEs who in turn
funneled the cash back into the residential mortgage market. The Fed now
is in a pickle. 50 If the Fed holds the securities, it may not have the cash
necessary to control interest rates and inflation through its traditional
method of purchasing and selling Treasury securities. Moreover, the Fed
may lose buckets of money as it holds very low interest securities in a
potentially rising interest rate market. Yet if the Fed sells the securities it
will book a large loss and drive interest rates up, injuring an already
stumbling economy. Most troubling perhaps is the Fed's self-interest in
keeping interest rates low to minimize the losses on its own portfolio, a goal
in potential conflict with its goal of setting interest rates to further the best
interests of the country's markets. For example, the Fed can choose not to
fight inflation with interest rate increases, to the benefit of their own
portfolio.
VI. WHAT SHOULD WE Do WITH FANNIE AND FREDDIE?
The government is mulling over what to do with Fannie and Freddie.
The President has a taskforce considering the program and Congress has
heard testimony from various experts on the matter and from the first two
directors of the FHFA. Financial newspapers and journals are full of op-ed
pieces containing recommendations. Advocates debate whether Fannie and
Freddie should be recast as a government agency, returned to its pre-
conservatorship form as a government sponsored enterprise, or
privatized.s'5 The first option would be to nationalize them. If
reconstituted as GSEs, the second option, Congress would have to
reconsider their missions, making, for example, explicit the government's
148 Id. ("[A]dd a required two percent surplus reserve and the number balloons to
$54 billion.").
149 See Appelbaum, supra note 135.
50 Id.
'' For an argument that all developed countries will inevitably do all of the above,
cyclically, see Edwards, supra note 19.
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role in re-insurance, and regulation.152 Finally, with the third option,
complete privatization, Fannie and Freddie could supply liquidity with or
without government reinsurance. 153 The option chosen would have to affect
the degree of government regulation. Former Secretary Paulson, for
example, has suggested that they be regulated as public utilities.15 4 There
are many choices and each choice comes with its own variants and
nuances.155
In any event, Congress is nearly paralyzed on what to do. The real
estate market is in a perilous condition, the GSEs .are under government
control and operating in a fashion, and any major organization changes
could spook the markets. Evidence of Congressional reluctance to act on
the question is evident in the 2000 plus page financial reform bill working
its way through Congress at the moment. The bill, designed to stop future
financial crises, does not deal with Fannie or Freddie and its role in the
mortgage crisis. Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee,
Barney Frank, has publicly stated that Congress does not need to do
anything - it has nationalized, read abolished, the GSEs, stemmed future
losses, and need only pay off the old losses.15 6
My recommendation? Return to 1938, with a caveat. In 1938, the
FHA, a government agency, was responsible for insuring loans to low and
middle income borrowers.'57 The loan insurance was understood to be a
government subsidy for targeted income groups. Cap the insurance
152 See, e.g., Dwight Jaffee et al., What to Do About Government-Sponsored
Enterprises, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY (2009); Dwight Jaffee & John M.
Quigley, The Government Sponsored Enterprises: Recovering from a Failed
Experiment, (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Inst. of Bus. and Econ. Research. Working
Paper No. W09-001, Feb. 2009).
1 Dwight M. Jaffee, Reforming Fannie and Freddie, REGULATION (Winter 2009);
David J. Reiss. Coming Out of Conservatorship: Developing an Exit Strategy for
Fannie and Freddie, FiNREG21 LOMBARD ST. (2009);. Lawrence J. White, On
Truly Privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Why It's Important and How To
Do It (Wharton Sch. Univ. of Pa. Working Paper June 23, 2005), available at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/05/0532.pdf.
154 Paulson Sees Changes For Freddie and Fannie, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009, at
B6.
1ss President Andrew Jackson, when faced with a similar question on what to do
with the federally charted Second Bank of the United States, simply vetoed
Congress's attempt to re-charter the Bank when its charter was up for renewal.
After the veto, the bank became private, shorn of any government privileges. A
few years later the bank, trying to support the price of cotton, failed and the
government did not bail it out; it died. See Alex J. Pollock, Fan and Fred: What
WouldAndrew Jackson Do?, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010, at Al 5.
156 Opinion, Barney to Fannie: Drop Dead, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2010, at A16.
157 Jaffee et al., What to Do About Government-Sponsored Enterprises, supra note
152, at 9.
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exposure and redefine the targets for the subsidy and empower the FHA to
provide the insurance. Fannie Mae, also a government agency in 1938,
was, simply put, a liquidity provider in the secondary market, a government
broker-dealer in mortgages. 58 It was a market maker. Return Fannie to its
original role but as a private actor with a federal corporate charter.
In the charter Fannie should be prohibited from accumulating a
portfolio of mortgage loans except as necessary to act as a dealer, with a
view to their timely resale. It should also be prohibited from owning any
derivative mortgage-backed securities or any other securities, for that
matter, except for the temporary ownership necessary, perhaps, in some
securitization underwritings of sales of MBSs to private investors or to the
public.' 59 In such a role Fannie would lose its power to insure mortgages or
pools of mortgages (except as a clearing house). Fannie would therefore no
longer be in competition with the FHA. Fannie would, in essence be a true
investment bank, limited to underwriting the resale of mortgage loans and
pools of mortgage loans.
Any debt placed by Fannie would not be implicitly or explicitly
guaranteed by the federal government and the funds would be used
exclusively to fund market making activities. Returns on the debt and
equity in Fannie would come solely from fees charged for its market
making activities.
In other words, Fannie would play the role of a trading market and
clearinghouse for mortgage loans, not unlike the NYSE's function for
stocks and bonds and the CBOE function for options. Fannie may
eventually have private market competitors. Using a trading market
analogy, one does not have to accept a role for Fannie as a guarantor of
mortgage debt. In its clearinghouse role it would only guarantee
performance on trades of debt by member traders.
Disabling Fannie and Freddie from insuring mortgages or guaranteeing
securities backed by mortgages puts my recommendation at odds with the
"current consensus" of government and academic economists.160 The
158 See Richard E. Mendales, The Fall and Rise of Fannie and Freddie:
Securitization After the Meltdown (Oct 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1489574#
1239676; Anthony B. Sanders & Robert Van Order, The Government's Role in
Housing & The Role of Fannie and Freddie: Dueling Missions and Dueling
Charters (Aug. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://mason.gmu.edu/
-asander7/GOV.pdf (they would continue the guarantee function however).
'5 This proposal has widespread support. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, Regulation
and Reform of the Mortgage Market and the Nature of Mortgage Loans: Lessons
from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 S.C. L. REV. 779 (2009).
'
6 0 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Mortgage Role for U.S. is Affirmed, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at B 1; Nick Timiraos, Housing Ills Cloud Debate on Fannie,
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consensus comes with a sense that the mortgage market will not function
well without some form of guarantee. The consensus breaks down
immediately when the discussion turns to the form of the guarantee,
however. Some want coverage of only catastrophic losses, others want
only secondary guarantees of private insurers,' 6 1 others want Fannie and
Freddie to sell explicit guarantees at market rates 6 2 and yet others want a
government insurance fund selling the guarantees. 6 1
All the proposals ignore the evidence from other developed countries
that show most other countries did not offer mortgage insurance of MBS
guarantees and yet have homeownership rates similar to ours.'
Furthermore, none of those countries suffered as severe a housing value
crash as we did. The most disheartening argument comes from self-styled
pragmatists who assert that Congress is no longer capable of resisting calls
for bailouts-in the housing sector whenever a crisis hits, so we should just
put the guarantee in place explicitly to better organize it.165
The primary winners of government guarantees and insurance programs
are Wall Street financiers who benefit from the trading activity generated
by under-priced asset insurance. Cheap insurance translates into trading
profits as market players seek to take full advantage of the gains from, in
essence, owning and reselling assets supported by the below cost insurance.
It should not surprise anyone that the most vocal supporters of the federal
insurance and guarantee program are found on Wall Street. Want to make
Wall Street happy? Have the government offer free "catastrophic
insurance" on all stock trading losses.
There is no doubt that the "cold turkey" elimination of the government
guarantees and insurance would push up mortgage interest rates by one or
two percent.'66 The effect on a struggling economy would be negative as
house sales and prices would decline further. Those who believe the
country cannot suffer the decline want a gradual phase in of any
WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2010, at A2. But see William Poole, Op-Ed, Say Goodbye to
Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2010, at A31.
161 See Appelbaum, supra note 160.
162 Donald Marron & Phillip Swagel, Whither Fannie and Freddie? A Proposal for
Reforming the Housing GSEs, E21 (May 24, 2010), http://www.economics21.org/
files/pdfs/commentary/05_24_2010_Whither.pdf, Unfinished Business, supra note
146, at 72.
163 Unfinished Business, supra note 146, at 71.
1 Michael Lea, Alternative Forms of Mortgage Finance: What Can We Learn
From Other Countries? 2-3 (Feb. 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www-rohan.sdsu.edul-realest/images/Harvard-Lea.pdf
165 Unfinished Business, supra note 146, at 71.
166 PINTO, supra note 129, at 3.
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elimination.167 I think the gradual phase-in programs are a mistake. They
would generate a split housing market, the insured and the uninsured, with
an excess demand for the insured mortgages and securities. The excess
demand will cause political pressure for favored allocations and will cause
grey market activity that necessarily follows all artificial price fixing. A
better approach would be the promulgation of a new tax credit for
approximately one point of residential mortgage interest (on top of the
current deduction) that is effective immediately and that is phased out over
time (dependent on economic conditions).
The transition to the position I recommend would be remarkably
straightforward. Fannie and Freddie would sell off over time their entire
portfolio of securities and most all their portfolio of whole loans. Congress
would sell its preferred stock to the markets and recharter the GSEs
including, among other things, an end the President's power to appoint
directors to the board and appropriate limits on the firms' powers. The
problem comes in how to unwind the existing GSE guarantees on MBS
securities and insurance on whole loans. Two-thirds of the GSE guarantees
on MBS securities could simply be voided by the government: The Fed
holds $1 trillion guaranteed securities, the Treasury holds $300 billion in
guaranteed securities and Fannie and Freddie hold $1.6 trillion in the
securities.168 The remaining guarantees on securities would have to be
renegotiated (bought out), assigned for cash to private insurers, or held to
the maturity of the securities. Insured whole loans would get similar
treatment.
VII. LESSONS FOR REGULATION
The saga of Fannie and Freddie provide numerous lessons, both macro
and micro, for careful observers of federal government regulation. I list
only a few below, those that have caught my attention.
First and foremost is the danger of the federal government giving a
generalized boost to a tangible asset-based trading market (in this case the
real estate market). The United States market has come to depend on
artificial price stimulus from a numerous number of federal plums: personal
tax deductions for interest payments on home mortgage debt; federal
mortgage insurance; federal deposit insurance for banks that originate and
hold home mortgages; federal subsidies for CRA loans-loans in distressed
neighborhoods and to low income and middle income wage earners; low
16 7 See Edward Pinto, The Future ofHousing Finance, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2010,
at A19 (discussing phase in programs).
168 Green & Schnare, supra note 17, at 2; Marron & Swagel, supra note 162, at 10;
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Issues Update on Status of
Support for Housing Programs (Dec. 24, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/2009122415345924543.htm.
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interest credit for banks that make home mortgage loans; insolvency
protection for banks that make home mortgage loans that fail (bailouts); and
others. The home ownership market is inherently "juiced." The
government has found it very difficult, if not impossible politically to fine
tuning the support so that it does not create artificial housing price bubbles.
Although now practically impossible to extricate the government, I envy
those modem economies (Canada and New Zealand, for example) that have
never swallowed the whole home subsidy pill. They will have a
competitive advantage to the United States over time.
Second, the mission creep of Fannie and Freddie should be a case study
for all Congressmen and women and all federal regulators. Regulators
should note the ease with which Fannie and Freddie in 1954, 1968, 1992
and 2008 slid from a carefully circumscribed role to the federal
nationalization of the entire housing financing market. No one, Presidents
and Congress included, has ever wanted the federal government to play
such a role, yet here we are. Each step was taken for incremental political
expediency: to raise private money, to get the debt off the books, to help
distressed neighborhoods, and to assuage the potential anger of powerful
foreign governments who are trading partners. No one discussed the long
run costs and the potential for calamity; immediate concerns drove each
decision.
The solution? Put in place an overall mission plan for agencies that is
specific (not a warehouse of general welfare benefits) and notes the effects
on all affected trading markets and then buy into it and stick to it.
Finally, when Congress does decide to subsidize target sub-
communities in the market, distressed neighborhoods and low-income wage
earners, Congress should fashion the subsidy to be transparent and cap it.
In other words, Congress must take care to put in place protections against
the subsidy leaking out and affecting risk decisions in the larger market.
Fannie and Freddie took a CRA subsidy and effectively gave it to everyone,
including real estate speculators, second home buyers, and wealthy home
owners. No one wanted to subsidize those markets in name of assuaging
the negative effects of income disparity.
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